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[51 C.2d 177; 331 P.2d 241

In Bank.
MAG~US

Oct.

J.

[1] Habeas Corpus--Grounds-Unconstitutional Statute or Ordinance.-Uahcns em·pus
available to test the
of
whieh a
is held.
!d.-Necessity for Actual Imprisonment.--The
of
of habeas corpus does not
on aetna] detention in
[3] Bail-Purpose-Effect of Admitting to BaiL-A
admitted to bail is constructively in custody nnd suhjeet to restraint
the
purpose of bail, whether before or
after
is practical assurance that he will attend on
the court when his presence is required.
[4]
to Admit to Bail.---The Supreme Court may adto hail pending determination of habeas
corpus proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 1'176.)
[5] Habeas Corpus-Jurisdiction.-Thc Supn'mc Court docs not
lack
to issue the writ of habeas corpus merely
becnuse another court has relPased petitioner on hail after the
of his
[6] Id.-R.estraint-Voluntary Custody.-Haheas corpus is an appropriate remedy to test the constitutionality of an ordinanf'P,
]Wtitioner was admitted to bail hy the municipal court
while the
Court was considering his pl'tition nnd
hefor(' it
the writ. (Disapproving· In re Ford, 160 Cal.
~1:3-t, 342 [116 P. 757]; E.c [Jarte Schmitz, 150 Cal. 663 [89 P.
; In re Gilkey, 85 Cal. A pp. -184 [259 P.
and In rc
Ortiz, 71 Cnl.App. 163 [234 P. SIT], insofar ns
are in~
consistent with this conelnsion.)
[7] Municipal Corporations- Ordinances- Validity- Presumptions--Onlinmwcs arP presunH'd to be valid, and no provision
of the c-hallenged ordinanee may he condemned as an impropPr
('xerciBe of the police power if any rational ground exists for
its enadment.
Halwns r·orpus to test
of ordinance undn
which petitioner is lwld, note, 32 A.L.R. 10:)4. Sc(; also Cal.
Jur.2d, Halwns
~ 20: Am .•Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 28.
P.IJ St•e Cal.Jur.2cl, Bail and
§ 3; Am.Jur., Bnil
and
~ ll et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] IIahens
Corpus, ~::i;
BaiL s~1, 14; [+]Bail, §7;
§4G; [GJ lblwas (ol'pus, ~6; [7jll11micipal
[8, 11-1:),
Streets,§ G9;
Higllwn:,·s, § 111;
Fnmehises,
§ 18;
HJ] C()nstitutional Law, § 85; [17, 18] Lieenses, § 8.
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Streets-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-There mny be rational
for the establishment of exclusive taxicab stamls since
an obstruetion of traffic
result if many enhs of different
should try to park at one stand, the sole
who has a
eounection with its exclusive Htnnd would
he in better position to maintain a constant cab service at
the
without an excessive
of cabs at some times
and a dearth at
and
stands may facilitate
a11d may prevent disorderly and
solicitation of one customer by drivers of different taxicab
[9] Highways-Use.--The use of highways by a common carrier is
a
which may be granted or withheld by tho state in
its discretion wHhout violating eithN the due process or equal
clause.
[10] Franchises-:Exclusiveness of Grant.-Generally, the government has po''··er to grant exclusive rights to engage in srrvices
of public character as contrasted with an ordinary business
or profession.
[11] Streets-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.--The power to establish exdusive taxicab stunds may be upheld as a regulation
condueive to the general welfare comparable to the granting
of an exelusive franchise.
[12] !d.-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-Since a municipality may
deny the use of its streets to all but one common carrier, it
may validly direct that each of several taxicab owners use
separate stands.
[13] !d.-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-The requirement that consent of the occupant of adjacent renl property he first obtained before stands on public streets may he useil by tnxicn bs
does not render unconstitutional an ordinance providing for
stauds re~trieted to the exdm<ivz: n:-oe hy one pe"JniltPe; it is
proper where the proposed activity is otherwise prohibited
and the prohibition is a reasonable exercise of the police power.

[14] I d.- Regulation- Taxicab Stands.- Tlw rerJuiremcnt of a
police code section that consl'nt of the occupant
of adjacent real property be flrst obtained lwfore stands on
public streets may be used is not necessarily um·ensonable hecause of the asserted lack of legitimate interest
such occupant; if the consent system has undesirable
such as
the power of the occup:mt to exact pnyment for his con:;ent,
the
of the advantages and disadvantages is a matter
of
wholly within the legislative power of the municipality.
[15] !d.-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-Tlw reqnireme11t
a
nnmidpal police code seetion that consent of the oteupant of

used by taxicnbs does not delegate to
to designate taxicab
eondition prPeedent to the
eesides in the ehief of poliee.
[16] Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-To Administrative Officers.-Generally, a
cannot eonunlimited
on an admini~trative officer without
his
but there are limitations
[17] Licenses-Power to License-Subdelegation of Authority.-The
of discretionary power to an administrative ofnot restricted by specific standards, to eonfer or grant
lic·cnsc,; or permits is upheld in a variety of situation,; where
the licensed aetivity, because of its dangerous or
might be regulated or restrictf;d to certain localities.
[18] Id.- Power to License- Subdelegation of Authority.-The
absence of express standards in those situations when; c1i~cre
tionary power is granted to an administrative offlcer to conf:e:r
licenses or permits docs not mean thnt the
ngPncy
may act arbitrarily or oppressively; it is
that the
agency will perform its public duty, but an abuse mny he
shown and relief obtained in the courts.
[19] Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-To Administrative Officers.-Standards for administrative action can
sometimes be found by implication.
[20] Streets-Regulation-Taxicab Stands.-'rhe purpose of controlling taxicab stands by issuance of permits by tlw chief
of police, as required by a municipal police eode
1s
to make satisfaetory and orderly taxieab service
able to the public without unnecessary obstruction of traillc;
the purpose supplies standards which the chief of police must
observe in granting or denying the permits, and additional
standards would not promote the objectives of the ordinance.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ denied.
' Lewis, Field, DeGoff & Stein and Marvin E. I1ewis for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarcnee A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, Tbomas C. lJyllelJ, District Attorney
Fran' Dion R. Holm, City Attorney (San Franeiseo), and
George E. Eaglin, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.
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mittee awl the number of vel1icles :nn
to lhc 1i1e slam!
t auy orw
and it shaH be unhm-!'ul for !he owrwr or
orwratol' of any public passen:cse1· vehi<·h' for
other than
thc
to oeeupy the s~ an<1. 1 Sed ion 1 L)G
in pal't, that a rll'iYer oi' a taxicab shall not
JJ]('llt
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t:.l1c
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or established in accordance with the pro~
1160 of the Police Code. 2
arrested when he
a taxicab owned
Cab
which had been
at the time
he was
held for trial
vxvHkULu"' sections 1119 and 1156.
While we

"""t"''"' 1115

habeas .::orpus is a proper
sections 1119 and 1156 are constitutional.
that l1abeas corpus is available
,.,,.au.vu under which a
47 CaL2d 25, 28 [300 P.2d
825];
re
19 CaL2d
495
P.2d 22] .)
ents contend that the writ does not lie because petitioner has
been admitted to bail by the
court. [2] The availof the
does not
on actual detention in
Where a person has been released on parole,
tbis court has issued habeas corpus,
out that he was
subject to restraint by the penal
29 Cal.2d 403, 408 [176 P.2d
Cal.2d 794, 797
P .2d 873].)
(3]
also
in
and
purpose of bail, whether
is
assurance that he will
court 1vhen his presence is
(See
46 Cal.2d 810, 813 [299
217] .)
this court may admit a
to bail
(Pen.
determination of habeas corpus
1476), and it would be unreasonable to hold that we
to issue the writ
because another
released him on bail after the filing of his petition.
wn:euucr

or

or eorporaor sedan, after such
given.''
and County of San Fransedan, while
Of the .J.Vi.lUWW!<
than or upon a stand
provisions of Sections

um.vu"'.u'"
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C.2d

conclude that, under the circumstaneec; present
corpus is
bail has
hPen allowed. 'l'he eases of MaUer
342
r.
, Ann.Cas. 1912D 1267,
150 Cal. 663 [89 P.
and In

1119 and 1156 ol' the Police
three
of a stand for the exelnsivL' use of one per~
mittee constitutes an unreasonable exercise ol' the
and violates the
protection clause, (2) the
of
consent of the occupant of the
real property is an
delegation to a private person of power
to decide who may have a taxicab stand on the public
and
) the provision which grants the chief of police diseretion to
exclusive stands fails to
any
standards to guide him in t11at respeet.
Section 589.6 of the Vehiele Code speeiflea 1ly empowers
local autlwrities to regulate taxicab stands on tl1e streets.
[7] Ordinances are presumed to be valid, and no provision
of the (•ha11enged ordinance may be condemned as an improper
rxrreisc of the police power if any rational gronnd exists for
its enaetmrnt. (Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal.2d 343,
848
P.2d
; Parker v. Collnmr, Hl6 Cal. 1G9, 178 [236
P. 921].) [8] In this connection it is apparent that taxi(,ab
stallds for the exclusive use of one permittee may, from the
point of Yiew of the public interest, have advantages over
stands open to alL I£ many cabs of different owners should
try to park at one stand, an obstruetion of i.raffie might result.
The sole
who has a telephone eonnection ·with its
exclusive stand would be in a better position to maintain a
roustant cab serviee at the strmd, without an 0xcessive supply
of cabs at some times and a dearth at others. Exelusivc stands
may facilitate police supervision and may prewut disorderly
and
solicitation of one customer by drivers of different taxicab owners. Aceording-ly, we cannot agree that there
are 110 rational
for the esi ahlishme11t of exclusive
we agree that the granting- of such stands to one
is invalidly discrimi~Hlior;.-. [9] The use of
a common carrier is a privilege whieh may be granted
or withlwld
the state in it:;; discretion, without violating
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the due process elause or the
clause.
69 L.Ed.
267 U.S. 307 [45 S.Ct.
38 A.L.R.
; Holmes v. Railroad Com., 197 Cal. 627,
P. 486] .) This rule was relied upon in the case
of In re
93 CaLApp. 88, 93 [269 P.
the court declared that a city council has the
abolish taxicab stands from its streets. [10] It has also
in
the
has
to
exclusive rights to engage in services of a
as contrasted with an ordinary business or pnne:s;:snHl
}fatter
163 CaL 668, 674-675
Ann.Cas. 1914A 152}
on another
in Russell v.
~c'ietJast,wn. 233 U.S. 195 (34 S.Ct. 517, 58 L.Ed.
]; 1
Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927), p. 580;
12 .Am.Jur. 227-228; 23 Am.Jur. 727; 22 Cal.Jur.2d 659.)
[11] The power to establish exclusive stands contained in an
earlier form of the ordinance here under consideration was
upheld as a regulation conducive to the
welfare
to the granting of an exclusive franchise. (People
v. Galena, 24 Cal..App.2d Supp. 770, 785 [70 P.2d 724] .)
[12] It seems obvious that, since a municipality may deny
the use of its streets to all but one common carrier, it may
validly direct that each of several taxicab owners use separate
stands.
[13] The requirement of consent of the occupant of the
adjacent real property does not render the ordinance unconstitutional. Such a requirement is proper where the proposed
is otherwise prohibited and the prohibition is a reasonable exercise of the police power. (Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 [37 S.Ct. 190, 61 L.Ed. 472]
billboards in residential street] ; cf. Crowley v. Christensen,
137 U.S. 86 [11 S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620], affirming Ex
Christensen, 85 Cal. 208 [24 P. 747] [retail liquor
.)
It is pointed out in the Cusack case that a Chicago ordinance
.,"'''llL'""'u~ the construction of billboards with the consent of
interested property owners could not injure the complaining
party because without such a
the billboards would
have been absolutely prohibited. In San Francisco the only
..,.,.,mn«u>n of the Police Code for the designation of taxicab
stands, aside from section 1119, is section 1117 which provides
for "public" stands at specified places not involved in the
present case, such as wharves and railroad depots. Section
1156 prohibits drivers from awaiting employment by passen-

the
he o<:enpant" of
property.
It cannot be said that the t'OllSClll
l't•asorwhle breaus(' of the assPrted laek of
on the part of tl1c oeeupant of the

pr('scnce of a taxicab stand in front of
proprrty may
lw desired
some
hotel owners) and eonsidf'J'ed
tionablP by otlwrs
home
. and those who wish
to haYe a taxil'ab stand in frollt of their
are interested
1ll
relations ·with
serYiee at the stand and in
tlw permitters. Under these circumstaners it c:an reasonably
he con"idercd in the interrst of harmouions rrlatimm and g-ood
scr-dee to give effeet to the preferences of the oer:npants of the
in designating stands and their
N's. If the
consent
also has nndr:sirable features. sueh as the
power of the oeeupant to exact payme11t for his eon~ent, the
of the advantages and
is a matter
wholly within the legislative power of' tlw municipality.
[15] By requiring the eonsent of
pel'som; the
Poliee Co(le does not
to them the power to
taxic·ah stands. rrhe ultimate power remains in the ehic'f of
poliee, and thP re(jnircment of eons0nt is only made a condition
to the de~ignation.
[16] \Vith respeet to the
of standal'c1s for administrative aetion the generd rnle is that a lrgislativr body
!'annot eonfer unlimited power upon an oflkrr without designaiing stanclat'il.s to guide his aetion.
Maid Milk
Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 641-642
P.2d 577] .)
However, there are limitations 011 the general rnle which arc
applic-able to the ease before us.
[17] 'l'he granting of di;;;erctionary power, not restrided
hy
standards, to confer or deny lieenses or permits
has been upheld in a variety of situations where the licensed
aetivity, bceause of its dan::;erous or objectionable character,
might be regulated or re~tricted to certain loeal itiefi. (Parker
v. Colburn, 106 Cal. 169. 177-178 [236 P. !l2Jl [permit for
puhlie
; In n: Ilolmcs, 187 Cnl. 640, 646-647 [203
P. 398] [permit for dealer in sceond-hand merc~handise] ; Ex

Oct.
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213 [24 P. 747]
as a
72 CaL 125, 127-128 [13
wooden
within tht~
San Gabriel,
[permit to drill for
[262

of
see
1 Cal.2d 87, 96
rule was applied in
93 Cal.App.
91, in sustaining a
power, IJOt
auy standards,
to grant and refuse
to occupy taxicabs stands. Similarly, an earlier form of the ordinance attacked here was
upheld in
v. Galena, supra, 24 Cal.App.2d Supp. 770,
779 et seq.
[18] The absence oE express standards in :mch situations
does not mean that the licensing agenc~y may act arbitrarily or
; it is presumed that the agency will duly perbut an abuse may he shown and relief
obtained- m the courts. (In re Holmes, supra, 187 Cal. 640,
647;
v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 440 [166
P.
v. c,:ty of Burlingame, 100 Cal.App.2d 321,
Oakland, supra, 87 Cal.
326 [223 P.2d 517]; Bleucl v. City
App. 594, 600.) 3 No
or
exercise of discretion
the chief of
detriment of petitioner,
has been shown in this case.
J\Ion•over, standards for administrative aetion ean
sometimes be found by implication. In Rescue Army v. Jlfu28 Cal.2d 460, 471 [171 P.2d 8], where an ordinance requiring a permit was involved, we held that sufficient
standards were inherent in the reasons which must have led
to the adoption of the ordinance. [20] 1n the present case
it is elear that the purpose of controlling taxicab stands by
of subdivision (d) of section 1119 which gives the
police power to revoke stand permits ''at his pleasure'' is not
involved in this case. It has been held that such a provision
means
the licensing agency may act only in the exercise of a wise
uiserdion, not that it
act capriciously. (Jf arrone v. City Manager
WorcesteT
N.E.2d 553, 554; People ex rel. Curtis v.
777 [173 N.Y.S. 417]; Jfac!Jonaid v. De Waclc,
N.W. 605, 606].)

C.2d
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is to make
taxicab service
available to the public without nnneecs;;:ary
obstruct ion of trafTic. This purpose
standards wbieh
the chief of
must observe in granting or denying the
It is diffieult to see how, as a practical
any
additional c;tandards eonld be set forth whieh would promote
i he
of the
and
wonld be aeeommust be made express.
Tlw writ is
Sehauer, J.,

and :M:rComh,

concurred.
CoJWnrring and Dissenting.--] agree with
the majority that habeas corpus is the proper remedy in
the situation here prrseni:ed and that habeas corpus will
lie despite the fact that petitioner has been admitted to bail.
I disagree with the conelusion of the majorit.v that sections
1119 and 1166 of ihe Police Codr of the City and County of
San Franeisco arc eonstitutional.
\Vith respr(,t to petitioner's eontention that the ordinance
lJerc involvrd is uneoHstitutional, it should be noted initially
that Nrw J'viontgomCJ'Y Street, on svhieh the Sheraton-Palac·e
Hotel
is a :-;treet dedirated to the publie use. \Ve hPld in
Escobedo v. State, 33 Cal.2d 870,875 [222 P.2d J], that" 'The
streets of a
belong to the peoplP of the state, and the
nse thrreof is an inalienable right of every citizen, subject to
legislative eontrol or such reasonable regulations as to the
traffie tlwreon or the manner of using them as the legislature
may deem ~wi::;c or proper to adopt and impose.' (19 Cal.
,Jur. 64, § 407.) 'Streets and highways are established and
maintaim'd primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by the publir, and nses incidental thereto. Such travel
may be for either business or pleasure .... 'fhe use of highways
for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilegP, hut a common and fundamental right, of which the public
and individuals eannot rightfully be deprived . . . . [A lll
yH:rsons have an equal right to usr them for purpo~es of travel
by JH'OJH'!' means. and wiih due regard for the eorre:;;ponding
rights of others.' (2:) Am .•Tur. 466-4:)7, § 16~); see also 40
c ..J.s. 21J4-2t7, § 28:3.)"
Petitioner contends that it is a de11ial of equal protection
of the laws for the eity to grant to one taxicab company the

street.

1n my

ion the <·ontcntiou is meritorious.

The business of operating taxicabs on the streets of a muis a munieipal affair,
to regulation by the
under its police power although such regulations
conflict with the
laws of tlw
G2 Cal.App.2d 306, 315
P.2d
Such regulation
ordinance
is expressly authorized
section
article XI, of the Constitution of this state (Grier v. Fersupra, 62 Ca1.App.2d 30G, 315). The section of the
Constitution that authorizes cities to make and enforce "local,
police, sanitary, and other regulations" does not, of course,
confer on eities the power to pass unreasonable ordinances or
ordinances in violation of the due proeess and equal protection
elauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Enactment of
arbitrary and discriminatory regulations may not be sustained
under the guise oE police power (.Justesen's l?ood Stores, Inc.
v. City of
12 Cal.2d :324, 329 [84 P.2d 140] ; La
F'mnchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal.2d 331, 336 [65 P.2d
1301, 110 A.hR. 639]).
"The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
makes but one demand upon the state, and gives to the state
but one right. It is that the state shall make, execute, and
interpret its laws without discrimination. It must not grant
rights to one which, under similar circumstances, it denies to
another." (Title Onamntee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal.
App. 152, 155 [183 P. 470].) A statute, or ordinance (In re
Blois, 179 Cal. 291 [17G P. 449]) meets the constitutional
requirements of equal protection if it relates to and operates
uniformly on the whole of a single class properly selected.
(Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 [300 P.2d 187] ;
.J crsey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 639,
640 [91 P.2d 577]; Ray v. Parker, 15 Ca1.2d 275, 283 l101
P.2d 665].) A law which subjects to equal burdens persons
similarly situated with respect to that law is an equal law
(Watson v. Division of JJ[otor V chicles, 212 Cal. 279, 284
[298 P. 481]; Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838
[300 P.2d 187]). In the Watson case, this court said: "So
long as the statute does not permit one to exercise the privilege while refusing it to another of like qualifieations, under
like conditions and circumstanees, it is unobjectionable upon"
the ground of inequality. And it was held in Sawyer v.
Barbour, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838, that a law was
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Stations Assn. v Brock,
Pasadena v. Stimson. 91 CaL
P.
.)
239 U.S. 33
, 60 LEd.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 r6 S.Ct. 1
30
LEd.
Wing v. United
163 U.S. 228
S.Ct. 977, 41 hEd.
; United States
Kirn Ark,
169 U.S. 649
S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890] ; Takahashi v. Fish
& Game
334 U.S. 410. 420
S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed.
1478] ; Hurd v. Hodge, :334 U.S. 24 [68 S.Ct. 847, 92 hEd.
1187] .) In the Takahashi case, tile Supreme Court of the
United States said that '' 'l'he Fourteenth Amendment and the
laws adopted under its authority thus embody a genrral policy
that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'in any
state' on an equality of
with 111l eitizrns under
nondiscriminatory laws.''
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the eity of San
Francisco every major hotel and rvery major shop and department store has a parking stand exclusively devoted to Yellow
Cabs. Although other cabs are permitted to discharge passengers at those points when the passengers have signified and
made known their destination, it is also a matter of common
lmo>Yledge that customers desiring a taxicab are not permitted
to take an
taxicab if Yello·vv cabs are waiting
there mweeupicd. This
is partieularly obnoxious to
one's senS(' of fair play. It is of (~Ourse quite obvious that
the
taxicab company has the
financial resources and is able to pay more for the "consent" of the
abnttillg owuer. In the
:,
it is stated that
''The presence of a taxicab stand in froiJt of private property
may be desired
some
hotel owners) and considered
obj0etionable by others
home owners) . . . . " This, of
course, is quite true and quite obvious. t~uite as true and as
obvious is the fact that any owner of any hotel or department
store desires to obtain as great a finaneial remuneration for
his '' eonsent'' as the tariff will bear! 'fhe holding of the
majority puts a premium on financial worth and is designed
to freeze out the smaller independent companies. It is my
opinion that as long as San Francisco is an "open" city so
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are concerned as distinguished from
where only one taxieab eompany
extended for the use of the streets

to be accomplished
to preserve or
the publie
or morals and where the orilinanee is
unreasonable in its application to the complaining party, it
will be held to be in violation of constitutional restrictions
Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 230 [118 P. 714]; Ma203 Cal. 665, 672 [265 P. 806]).
Bearing iu mind the above-mentioned rules, au examination
of the ordinance in question shows that, upon application,
permits are issued to taxicab companic>s which grant to each
company the exclusive right to use a certain portion of the
public streets. All duly lieenscd taxicab companies fall within
the same class and must, according to the constitutional
mandate>, be aceorded rqual protection. No one company may
be given "particnlar privileges" while another is diseriminated
in the 1ray of location of stands for its cabs.
This
was considered in City & Co11nty of Denver v.
J:l5 Colo. 132
P.2d 1016, 1020],
where the
Court of Colorado said: "Although under
our laws a
may properly designate areas in which street
or
utilities may operate, it cannot grant an
exclusive license to onr part oJ' the city's strerts to one taxicab
company and deny the same to othrrs lawfully operating
within its eorporate limits. Each class of licem;es or permits
for partieular uses of highways, to be valid, must be general
and
in their operations." In the ease at bar, Yellow
Cab
would have the same right to object, on eonto the exc-lusive use of the portions of the
public streets alloeated to other eab companies. The public
streets are
thr usc
the
as a
and while the
control of traffic nwy make it !H'eessary for the city,
in the
of its
power, to set aside certain designated areas; of the :-;1 l'<'Pts foe taxi sta!](ls, tbose stands should
be open to the use of all those "who ;;;tand in
the
same relatiou to the
of the law.''
142 Cal.App.2d 827. 838 [800 P.2d 187].) The flrdinance here i11volved
in effect, for exclusive parking
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certain segments of a class as against other
members of that class. Such a regulation has no reasonable
tendency to preserve, or protect, the public health, safety or
welfare and must fail because it doE's not operate uniformly
on the whole of a single class properly selected (Sawyer v.
142 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 [300 P.2d 187]).
in the majority opinion appear to be
with the argument that
the use of "exclufrom "open"
will the orderly
administration of traffic, service to the public, and ''good
relations with the permittees" be maintaim'd. Another argument subscribed to by the majority is that only a taxicab
company sufficiently affluent to maintain a telephone connection can furnish ''constant cab service at the stand, without
an excessive supply of cabs at some times and a dearth at
others.'' All of these arguments are so easily met and the
answers are so obvious that it seems unnecessary to engage
in any extended discussion of them here. It seems obvious
that the stands could be so regulated that only a certain
number of cabs could stand there at any one time; that the cab
first in line would take the first customer and the others thereafter moved up in line allowing another cab to take its place
at the end of the line. It should be noted that as a matter
of fact this is precisely the way the Yellow Cab Company
operates its "exclusive" stands. It is also a matter of common
knowledge that all taxicabs arc now radio-controlled, or operated, so that the driver may be called to pick up passengers
at any given point. It is ridiculous to say, as docs the majority opinion, that ''Exclusive stands may faeilitate police
supervision and may prevent disorderly and aggressive solicitation of one customer by drivers of different taxicab owners.''
Inasmuch as each individual taxicab, whether owned by one
company or another, charges the legal fare and since all are
equipped with meters. there could be no more aggressive solicitation of customers if differently owned cabs were allowed to
use the one stand than if all the cabs using it were owned by
one company under the
outlined above. As a matter
of fact, it appears to me that taxicab service would be facilitated, rather than hindered, if all stands were "open" ones.
I am sure that every taxicab user has had the experience of
waiting patiently for a Yellow taxieab at one of the major
hotels after a large event of some type had eoneluded. If
eabs of other companies were permitted to use the present
exclusive stands, service would be bettered.
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that
amicus curiae Yellow Cab
of 0xclnsive cab stands is a proper exercise of
pow0r in that it aids in the identifieation of drivers
aids in the maintenance of discipline at the
stands, and aids in the maintenance of continuous service at
the stands. It is also argued that police problems are minicruising by cabs is lessened thus aid
in
the
traffic problem; that the abutting landowner is "assured of
peace of mind in being free of boisterous and
ionable behavior by drivers and litter"; that the abutting land owner is
assured of good cab service for his patrons. These arguments
fail to convince. They assume that only by segregation of
the various cab companies can the public peace, welfare and
convenience be served. There can surely be no assumption
that only the drivers for one company will not cause litter
on the public streets, or not be guilty of boisterous conduct,
or fail to provide service to the public, or be guilty of overcharge, or other unlawful conduct. All taxicabs are required
to be distinctively marked, and pres1lmably all drivers for all
companies possess the required qttalifications and have been
duly licensed as required by law. It is difficult to see how
open taxi stands would have any deleterious effeet insofar as
police problems are concerned. The companies retain control
of their drivers, the number of cabs at any one stand at one
time is a matter readily eapable of regulation, and it would
appear that open cab stands would have no effect whatsoever
insofar as the cruising problem is concerned. As a matter of
fact the so-called ''cruising taxicab'' is tl1e prospective customer's only hope during rush hours when all the exclusive
Yellow Cab stands are completely unoccupied. Again, the
traffic problem, service to the public, and the orderly use of
the public streets, would be facilitated, rather than hindered,
if unoccupied taxicabs of other companies were permitted to
stand in the vacant stands set aside for the exclusive use of
the Yellow Cab Company.
As has bern heretofore set forth all taxicabs fall within
one dass and any legislation affecting that class must operate
equally upon members of the class.
Amicus euriae also contends that the use of the public
streets for private gain is a matter of privilege and not of
right and that such privilege may be prohibited or regulated in
the public interest. The contention is, of course, meritorious.
But when the privilege is granted, it must be granted on
equal terms to all within the class to which it is granted. In

, the
the
that

that all peTsons
(Old Dearborn
299 F.S. 18~l [il7 S.Ct .
. ) ''
added.)
It is no answer to the constitutional
to the ordinance that the
owner must consent to the
's
use of the street for a taxicab stand. An
landowner
retains only the
of ingress and egress to his property.
In Bacich v. Board
Control., 23 Cal.2d
350 [144
P.2d 818], we held that the "owner of property abutting
upon a public street has a property right in the nature of an
easement in the street which is appurtenant to his abutting
property and which is his private right, as distinguished from
his right as a member of the public. That right has been
described as an easement of ingress aud egress to and from his
property . . . . " Amicus curiae argues that the
owner has the right to "waive" his ingress and egress rights
as to certain taxicabs and that waiving it as to one company
is not a waiver as to all companies. This contention was
answered adversely in Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U.S.
279, 303 [26 S.Ct. 9], 50 LEd. 1921, where the court said:
''But the right of the railroad company, as abutting owner
and the rights of passengers are not, in thrir nature, paramount to the rights of others of the general publie to use
the sidewalk in question in legitimate ways and for legitimate
purposes. Licensed hackmen and cabmen, unless forbidden
by valid local regulations, may, within reasonable limits, use
a public sidmvalk in prosecuting their calling, provided such
use is not materially obstrurtive in its nature, that
of such
exclusive character as, in a substantial sensE', to prevent
others from also using it upon <'qual terms for legitimate purposes. Generally speaking, public sidewalks and streets are
for use by all, upon equal terms, for any purpose consistent
with the object for which such sidewalks and streets are established; subject of course to such valid regulations as may he
prescribed by the constituted authorities for the public convenienee; this, to the end that, as far as possible, the rights
of all may be conserved without undue discrimination."
It is conceded that the municipality has the paramount

situated will be treated al£kc.

]

chooses
of the public
welfare and
property
oww~r has is that such stands do not interfere with that right
of
and egress. It is not within the power
an
upon those who are ent itlecl
terms w£th others ·''·nwu..rrn
situated.
v.
48 Ca1.2d 189, 195
[309 P.2d 10], that "An abutter's casement of access arises
as a matter of law
v.
19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d
505]). It is a property right enjoyed
the abutter as an
incident of his
of property, and is separate and
distinct from the right of the general public in and to the
street. 'While certain general rules have been set forth in the
various decisions which have considered the nature and scope
of this right, each ease must be considered upon its own facts.
The right of access has been defined as extending to a nsc
of the road for purposes of ingress and egress to his property
by such modes of conveyance and travel as are appropriat0
to the highway and in such manner as is customary or reasonable. (Rose v. State, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 728.) It is more
extensive than a mere opportunity to go into the street immediately in front of one's property. (Racich v. Boarcl of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343 [144 P.2d 818] .) HmYevcr it do0s not
rxtcnd beyond acceF>s to the next intersection at either end of:
the street upon wllich the property abuts.
v. City
of
64 Cal.App.2d 487 [149 P.2d 2961.)
inconveniences which may be suffered af:ter surh int0rsection is
reaehcd do not impair the easement but are inconvenienc0s
suffered
him as a nwmber of the public." We were not
concerned with whether the abutter had the r:rclusivc right
to the public street abutting his property to the intersection.
If I were to concur in the reasoning used by amicus curiae and
the majority, I would be agreeing that the abutter had the
exclusive right, even as against the municipality, to decide who
would nsc the parking area in the public streets in front of
his property to the intersection at either end thereof. It will
51 C.2d-7
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;dat(•d that Hw
ahntier's
did "nol nxteud
tliP JIPXI
irrtPn;eeiion :1t either l'lld of' 11H' sin'''l 1!JlOll wlii<-h tlw property

almts.''
The majority agTers wiih the c:ontention of: thr Pc:oplc that
a drterminatiou as to whethrr or not elosecl taxicabs stands
are in the public int('rcst is a
matter. Heliance is
plaeed Oil the I'H:-it' of
\'. (iulrn!', :!cj. CaL\pp.~cl Supp.
770 [70 P.2d 724], wherc·in the same type of ordinance was
held eonstitutional and that the equal proteeotion clause was
not violated. In the Galena case, the city of San Francisco
had granted an exelusive cab stand on a public street to Yellow
Cab Company. 'rhc driver of a I~uxor Cab was arrested for
standing his cab in that stand, and the appellate department
of the superior court affirme1l the judgmrnt of conviction of
violation of the ordinaner. ·while the Galena case involved
approximately the same ordimmce as the one under consideration, .it is, of course, not binding on this court. When the
question arises in a proper case it is the province of the
judicial department of this state to finally determine the
constitutionality of the judgment of the legislative body. 'l'his
court should not be concerned with the poliey of the legislative
body, but with the constitutionality of the enactment.
Petitioner also contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional in that it confers unlimited discretion upon the Chief
of Police in both granting the permits for taxicab stands and
the revocation of such permits. There is no standard set forth
to guide the Chief of Police in granting the permit and any
permit so geantrd may be revoked "at hi::; pleasure." "It is
the function of the Legislature to declare a policy and fix the
primary stan(!anl. 'fo promote the purposes o£ the legislation
and carry it into effect, the authorized administrative or ministerial offic:er may 'fill up the details' by pre:,eribiug administrative rules and regulations (Ji'irst Industrial Loan Co. v.
Daugherty, 26 Cal.2d 545, 549 [159 P.2d 921] ), but as so
empowered, he may not 'vary or enlarge the terms or conditions of [the] legislative 0nactment' (Boone v. Kingsbury, 206
Cal. 148, 161 [273 P. 797]; also Whitcomb IIotcl, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 758, 7:'57 [151 P.2d 2:l3, 155
A.L.R. 405]) or 'compel that to be done 1\·hich lies without
the seope of the statute.' (Pirst I11dustrial Loan Co. v.
Da1tghcrty, supra, p. 550.)" (Kmrdscn Creamery Co. v.
Brock, 37 Cal.2d 485, 492, 4:l3 [234 P.2cl 26] .) .And "While
the delegation of governmental authority to an administrative
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body is proper in some instances, the delegation of absolute
legislative discretion is not. To avoid such a result it is necessary that a delegating statute establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administrative body." (Stale Board of Dry
Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lu.x Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal.2d 436, 448
[254 P.2d 29].) Tn ]i'ranchise Tax Board v. Superior Court,
36 Cal.2d
548 [ 225 P .2d 905], we said : "It is well
established that a legislative body may delrgate to a hoard or
officer the discretion of carrying out a declared policy according to a
fcs! or standard. It is not necessary that
the IJ;'gislaturc ' . . . find for itself every fact upon which it
desires to basr lrgislativc action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations whieh it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular
facts and circumstances. . . . These essentials are preserved
when ... [the legislative body] has specified the ba:sie conditions of fact upon IYhosc existence or Of'currenee, ascertained
from relevant data by a designated administrative agency,
it directs that its si atntory command shall be effective.'
(Yakus v. United
321 U.S. 414, 424-425 [64 S.Ct. 660,
88 L.Ed. 834]; accord Bi-J1Ietalic Inv. Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 [36 S.Ct. 141, 60 I1.Ed. 372];
Field d': Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 [12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed.
294].) " A reading of the ordinance involved shows that no
basic conditiom or facts are set forth to guide the Chief of
Police; that hi~ diseretion i.s absolutely undefined and unlimited both as to granting and revoking the permits for taxicab
stands. Tt has been held that the legislative body must declare
thr policy of the law and fix some kind of legal principles
which arc to control in given eases. It must provide an adequate yardstick for the guidance of the executive or administrative body or officer empow0red to execute the law. (Blatz
Brewing Co. v. Collins, 69 Cal.App.2d 639, 645 [160 P.2d
371; Schaczlcin v. Cabrmiss, 135 Cal. 466 [67 P. 755, 87 Am.
St. Rep. 122, 56 IJ.RA. 7331.)
The ordinance involvrd herr constitntrs speeial Irgislation in
violation of the Fonrtrenth Amendment to thr Constitution
of the Unitrd Stat0s which provides that no state shall deny
to any JH'rsoll within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the la\YS. The equal protec-tion elause applies to all departments of Ntate goyrrmnent (People v. Hines, 12 Cal.2cl 535
[86 P.2d 921; Brock v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.2d 605 [86
P.2d 805]; .E.x parte Virgiuia, 100 U.S. 339 [25 IJ.Ed. 676);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed.
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Wilson. 307
or
which flows
. 238] .) As

rick Wo

Y.

30 LEd. 220],
an aclministration directed so

and

nnr"''"i''" as to amount to a practical denial by the State of
of the laws which is seenred to the
petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face
and
in appearance, yet, if it is applird and administered by public
with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances matrrial to
their
the dc-nial of equal justice is still w·ithin the
prohibition of the Constitution.''
92 U.S. 275 [23 L.Ed. 550] ;
100 U.S. 339 [25 L.Ed. 676]; Neal v.
.)
[26 L.Ed.
Article I, section
of the California Constitution provides
that "No
privileges or immunities shall ever be
granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by
the Legislature, nor shall any
or class of citizens, be
granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms,
shall not be granted to aU citizens." (Sec also art. IV, § 25,
sn bd. 33; art. I, §
This srction applies to and constitutes
a restraint upon boards of supervisors of counties (In re Blois,
179 CaL 291 [176 P.
; .Acton v.
150 Cal.App.
2(1 1, 18
P.2d 481] ). It has also been eonstruPd to mean
''
well
'' (~Vat son v.

Division
v. Barbont, 142

P. 481] ;

P.2d 187] ; City of
Tulare v. Ihvn:n, 126 Cal. 226
.) It was the ohjcet
of the framers of the Constitution to preveu t Yicious legislation for private ends which might be
in an apparently

;;)H .iJ:lO].)
of a class is hrld to be

topart

and witl1in Hw i'Onstit ational
(J[e Donal rl Y. Con
, Dfl CaL 386
P 71 ;
l'asad! na v. Stimsm1. 91 CaL 2:38
P.
; Lelandc

:w Cal.2d 224 [T)7 P
A.L.H. 1
Sr:n·c Yoursdt" Oas. Stations
124£1 P.2d
; Brock v
P.2<1
Tn ordel' to ayoid the fad thai tlJ<'
lwte in ;pres·
tion fixe's no standard to
the administrative olfieer, the
Parker v. Col!mrn. 19G CaL HHI
P.
921], \\·hid1 il1Yo1vcd a
to rrt>et and maiuta
a public
garage in the
of Oaldand.
>nts held that because a
garage· had a
to inc·n'ase the fire
it was within tho
power to
a
fol' the "onstnwtion
tlJerr•ol'. 'l'he c·ase did not inYolYe th:
of a permit
for the eum;trudion of
g:u·age
like cireumstauee~, it ,,·as
to anoth<•l', alld tlJo ordiuan<·e inYolyed
and speeifit·a.l !y nwntionr,J three "<'lasses" of garages which
were defined. A elass "C" g;lt'age \HlS not more thau "one
story high and [vrhieh
a c·ement floor"
inyolved in
the ease. A standard to gnide the admini:;t t·ati n' ofli(·er 1Yas
thcrrforc set forth. Jn In
187 Cal. 640 [203 P.
:mR], tbe
should
have
powers ovet·
in
"se(·ond-hand mrrehml!lisn" among other rnunwrai;•d art ides.
rl'he
('Olltc·ndef1 that a JWI',iOll
in Sec·ond-hand
hooks dirl not eOJl!e IYitJ:iu tlJr te>rms of the on1inanee. rl'he
ordimuH'o
one
iu SU(:h seeoni1-hand mer-

ehandisr to obtain a permit for the sale thereof. 'l'lw ease did
not iuvoln' the granting of a
to one when it was denied
to another. And the case stands
for the
that the term ''merchandise'' intludes ''books'' aud that the
regulation of the sale of such second-hand books is a lawful
exer(:ise of the police power Ex parte
85 CaL
208 [24 P. 747], invohed the granting, or
to sell
It is not in
inasmuc·h
that if a governing power could prohibit
altogether
it could
sueh conditiolls as it saw fit. 'l'his docs not
mean that, under the same conditions, it eould prohibit the
issuanee of a license to one in the same class while granting
such a license to another of a like elass. In any event, the
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ordiumwe there involyed provided fol' the
alternative: That in trw event a majority of the board of police emumissioners refused to grant a permit for the issuance of such
a license, the applicant could procure the conseu t of twelve
eitizeus \Yho owned real estate in the area, and a liecuse was
thereupon issued to him. Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 123 [13 P.
310], involved an ordinance prohibiting the alteration, repair,
or construction of any wooden buildi11g within certain preS(';ribed fire limits without permission in writillg signed by a
majority of the firewardeus and approved by a majority of
the committee on fire department and the mayor. The court
quoted from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064,
30 hEd. 220], and noted, spccifieally, that the ordinance did
not diserimiuate against persons within a certain dass but
operated equally on all within the class. 'l'he ordinance
singled out wooden buildings-not all buildings. In other
words, ''wooden'' lmildings constituted the class. Other cases
cited in the majority opinion fall within the r:;ame general
elassification and are not in point here. The ordi11ance here
involved operates unequally on all within a, class. 'I'here ir:;
nothing to guide the chief of poliee in his designation of
which company shall oceupy which taxicab stand. As I have
heretofore noted, all taxicab companies must be licensed; all
the drivers for such companies must be lieensed and arc required to pass au examination prior thereto. There is absolutely no legal basis on which to favor one company over another and yet it is very apparent that one member of the same
class has been favored over all othcrc; of the same class.
It is obvious that the ordinance docs not satisfy the requirements set forth in the preeeding citations of authority
and should,
be held void for the additional reason
that it eom;ti1utes au unconstitutional
ol' lPgislative
discretion to an administrative officer.
Por the foregoing reasons I would discharge the prisoner.
HeRpoudC'JJt 's petition for a rehearing was denied November
1958.
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